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Clean Sweeps: Protecting Officer Safety
and Preventing the Imminent Destruction
of Evidence
Catherine A. Fisket
After lawfully entering a home to arrest a suspect, a police of-
ficer hears suspicious noises from a remote corner of the premises.
She thinks, "The fourth amendment requires a search warrant, but
I haven't got one. What if that sound is someone with a gun? Or
someone destroying evidence? What should I do?" Despite her un-
certainty, she conducts a quick sweep of the residence and discov-
ers, in the attic, a pound of marijuana and a cat. Because hidden
confederates can create dangers, lower courts are upholding protec-
tive sweeps' such as this one, a cursory warrantless search of the
premises for people, but not for things.
Is this proper? The fourth amendment protects individuals
against unreasonable searches and seizures.2 In general, before po-
lice can engage in a search or seizure, the Constitution requires
that an objective magistrate issue a warrant based upon probable
cause. In the context of residential searches, this requirement oper-
ates as a safeguard against arbitrary police intrusion into the pri-
vacy of the home.' Yet there are circumstances, "jealously and
carefully drawn, ' 4 where courts have interpreted the Constitution
not to require police officers to obtain warrants.
t B.A. 1983, Brown University; J.D. Candidate 1988, The University of Chicago.
1 Courts have used a number of terms to describe the protective sweep, including
"safety sweep," "security check," and "cursory sweep." For purposes of this comment, the
terms are interchangeable.
2 The fourth amendment to the U.S. Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
I A magistrate's review serves two functions. It prevents judgment by hindsight,
whereby a search is validated just because it happened to be successful, and it interposes an
objective outsider who is detached from the events that led the police officer to her
conclusions.
' Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967).
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In determining the validity of any warrantless search, the Su-
preme Court applies a balancing test to weigh the citizen's interest
in freedom from arbitrary invasion against the state's interest in
safe and effective law enforcement. For example, where there is no
time to get a warrant without unreasonably jeopardizing safety or
permitting the destruction of evidence, the Supreme Court deems
a warrant unnecessary under the doctrine of exigent circumstances.
Applying this doctrine, the Court has approved few searches, and
only under the following conditions: hot pursuit of a fleeing felon,'
extinguishing and investigating the causes of a fire,7 and evidence
in the process of natural deterioration.8 A second, more narrow ex-
ception to the warrant requirement is invoked where the search is
considered "reasonable," in part because the search is so limited in
time and scope that the warrant and probable cause requirements
may be waived altogether." These two principles, exigent circum-
stances and limited searches, may justify police efforts to control
hidden third parties by means of protective sweeps.
Although the purpose of the protective sweep is not to uncover
evidence, but rather to locate people who might jeopardize public
safety 10 or destroy evidence, the plain view doctrine would allow
the admission of any evidence discovered in plain view during the
course of the sweep.1" To preserve the privacy of the home in the
face of this possibility, some lower courts have insisted that the
sweep be strictly limited in time and depth, stressing that the
search is cursory and preventive in nature. As the Supreme Court
has explained, "the scope of a warrantless search must be commen-
surate with the rationale that excepts the search from the warrant
requirement."12 Enforcing this principle, the courts apply the ex-
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
* See, for example, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
See, for example, Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509 (1978).
8 See, for example, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (blood alcohol
test); Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (fingernail scrapings).
' See, for example, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (requiring only reasonable suspicion
that person is armed and dangerous prior to stopping and frisking him); Chimel v. Califor-
nia, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (requiring probable cause to arrest, but not requiring probable
cause to search the grabbing area of the arrestee).
10 The phrases "threats to police" and "threats to public safety" are used interchangea-
bly in this comment.
11 In Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1968), the Supreme Court reiterated:
"It has long been settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be introduced in evi-
dence." If the protective sweep is lawful, then any evidence discovered in open view during
the sweep is admissible at trial.
11 Murphy, 412 U.S. at 295 (footnote omitted).
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clusionary rule"3 to bar the admission of evidence which officers
would not have discovered had they been looking only for people.14
Given exigent circumstances and a limited search, it would be
unreasonable to require the police to obtain a search warrant if
that would expose the officers and the public to unnecessary harm,
or would cause the irrevocable loss of evidence. Lower courts thus
consider the protective sweep to be a relatively minimal additional
intrusion on the arrestee's privacy in comparison to the public in-
terest in safe and effective law enforcement. But the courts are not
in agreement over the degree of urgency necessary to support a
protective sweep. As a result, arresting officers have no guidance as
to when they may lawfully initiate a protective sweep.
This comment aims to resolve this confusion. In Section I, the
comment surveys the Supreme Court decisions which bear on pro-
tective sweeps. Section II will then examine the circuit courts' va-
rying interpretations of the Supreme Court's dicta, and will point
out the circuit courts' general confusion over use of the protective
sweep. Finally, Section III will compare two alternative protective
sweep models, one that adopts a bright-line rule authorizing pro-
tective sweeps incident to all arrests within the arrestee's premises,
and another that requires individual findings of cause to search.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S DICTA: DISCERNING THE CRITERIA FOR
A CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIVE SWEEP
The Supreme Court has never squarely defined the concept of
a protective sweep, or indicated under what circumstances such a
cursory search might be constitutional. However, two lines of the
Court's reasoning support the lower courts' introduction of a pro-
tective sweep exception to the warrant requirement: the exception
for limited searches and the exception for exigent circumstances.
These are overlapping and interwoven principles which require
some untangling.
A. The Limited Search Incident To Arrest
Although no Supreme Court decision has upheld a warrantless
" Although the Constitution does not require the exclusionary rule, see United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 905-06 (1984), the Supreme Court will not allow evidence which is the
product of an unconstitutional search or seizure to be admitted at trial. See Weeks v.
United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). The rule is intended to deter unlawful police con-
duct, see Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 633 (1965), and to promote the integrity of the
judicial system, see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222-23 (1960).
" See United States v. Kolodziej, 706 F.2d. 590, 597 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983).
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search solely because it was limited in time or depth, the finding
that the search was no more intrusive than necessary often has
been decisive in upholding searches. The two seminal cases in the
category of minimally intrusive searches are Chimel v. California5
and Terry v. Ohio."'
Before Chimel, most courts, relying on Harris v. United
States 7 and United States v. Rabinowitz, 8 permitted thorough
warrantless searches of a home incident to any lawful arrest
therein. In Harris, police lawfully arrested the defendant in his liv-
ing room on charges of check forging, whereupon they extensively
searched his entire apartment for more checks. The Court sus-
tained the search because it was "incident to arrest."' 9 Similarl ,
in Rabinowitz the Court upheld the warrantless search of Rabino-
witz's office because the police had arrested him on the premises:
"[There is a right] to search the place where the arrest is made in
order to find and seize things connected with the crime ... "I'
These cases produced a now defunct doctrine known as the Harris-
Rabinowitz rule.
In 1969, the Supreme Court in Chimel radically restricted the
scope of permissible searches incident to arrest. In that case, police
had a warrant to arrest Chimel for allegedly robbing a coin shop,
but did not have a warrant to search his home. After arresting
Chimel, the officers meticulously searched his entire three bedroom
home for stolen coins. Although the Court struck down the search,
it held that
it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for
and seize any evidence on the arrestee's person in order to
prevent its concealment or destruction. And the area into
which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or
evidentiary items must, of course, be governed by a like rule.
• . . There is ample justification therefore, for a search of the
arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate con-
trol"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of weapon or destructible
evidence.2
395 U.S. 752 (1969).
's 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
331 U.S. 145 (1947).
'8 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
19 Harris, 331 U.S. at 151-52.
10 Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. at 61, quoting Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
21 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
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Chimel thus authorized searches of the area within the grabbing
reach of the arrestee, while barring those routine searches of the
entire premises incident to arrest which were once sanctioned by
the Harris-Rabinowitz rule.
At first glance, Chimel appears to foreclose any search of the
premises beyond the arrestee's immediate control. But while the
opinion defines the relationship of the arresting officer to the ap-
prehended suspect, it fails to consider the threat posed by a third
party on the premises who could have a weapon or who could con-
ceal or destroy evidence. The Court noted that "[a] gun on a table
or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous
to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the per-
son arrested,"22 but it did not discuss the danger posed by a gun in
the hands of a confederate in the corner room. Then, if one were to
extend Chimel's logic, one could justify a limited protective sweep
incident to arrest for people who pose risks comparable to those
posed by the arrestee: a gun in the hands of a confederate is argua-
bly as dangerous to an arresting officer as a gun concealed in the
arrestee's clothing.
There are other instances besides Chimel where the Court has
authorized limited searches in order to protect public safety. In the
context of investigative stops, the Court has upheld a limited war-
rantless search to prevent harm to an officer where the officer has a
reasonable basis for suspecting that a person whom the officer has
stopped is armed and dangerous. In Terry v. Ohio,23 the defendant
aroused a police officer's suspicions by apparently "casing" a store
for a robbery. When the policeman stopped the defendant to ques-
tion him and received no coherent response, the officer frisked the
defendant and discovered a pistol in his pocket. The defendant ob-
jected to the patdown, arguing that the officer lacked probable
cause to arrest or search him.
Upholding the frisk, the Court indicated that the parameters
of a search determine, in part, the search's constitutionality. Here,
the search was no broader than necessary to find weapons: "[The
officer] did not conduct a general exploratory search for whatever
evidence of criminal activity he might find;" he merely patted
down the outer clothing of the defendant.24 Thus, the more super-
ficial the invasion, the more likely the Court is to uphold the
22 Id. at 763.
23 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21 Id. at 29, 30.
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search.25 Like the search in Terry, the protective sweep is no more
intrusive than necessary to achieve its preventative purposes.
B. Exigent Circumstances
1. The Threatened Destruction of Evidence. Dicta in several
Supreme Court decisions suggest that in certain exceptional cir-
cumstances, the threatened destruction of evidence, coupled with
probable cause, provides a legitimate basis for foregoing the war-
rant requirement. For example, in Johnson v. United States, the
Court found a search unconstitutional because there were no ex-
ceptional circumstances in the case and "[n]o reason [was] offered
for not obtaining a search warrant except the inconvenience to the
officers. ' 26 The police had detected the odor of burning opium em-
anating from Johnson's hotel room, but did not assert that "evi-
dence or contraband was threatened with removal or destruc-
tion. '2 7 In a somewhat more recent case, Schmerber v. California,
the Court upheld a warrantless blood alcohol test performed on a
clearly intoxicated man. Here the police officer "might reasonably
have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which
the delay necessary to obtain a warrant under the circumstances
threatened 'the destruction of evidence .. .2
In Chimel, the dissenters, Justices White and Black, argued in
favor of a broad "search incident to arrest" exception to the war-
rant requirement. Justice White contended that
assuming that there is probable cause to search premises at
the spot where a suspect is arrested, it seems to me unreason-
able to require the police to leave the scene in order to obtain
See also Murphy, 412 U.S. at 296 (noting limited nature of taking scrapings from
fingernails).
26 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
7 Id. Similarly, in McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948), the Court did
not face a situation where "property [was] in the process of destruction" or was "likely to be
destroyed." Comparable language was used in United States v. Jeffers, where the Court
found there to be "no question of. . . imminent destruction, removal or concealment of the
property intended to be seized." 342 U.S. 48, 52 (1951). In Jeffers, police officers entered
and searched a hotel room rented by Jeffers' aunts. The officers did not have a search or
arrest warrant. The aunts were absent, there were no exceptional circumstances, and the
officers could have prevented any destruction of evidence by merely guarding the door. By
negative implication, the decision suggests that destruction of evidence could, in some cir-
cumstances, excuse the failure to obtain a warrant.
8 384 U.S. at 770 (citations omitted). See also Murphy, 412 U.S. at 296, where police
had probable cause to believe that a suspected strangler had blood under his fingernails.
These circumstances "justified the police in subjecting him to the very limited search neces-
sary to preserve the highly evanescent evidence they found under his fingernails."
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a search warrant when they are already legally there to make
a valid arrest, and when there must almost always be a strong
possibility that confederates of the arrested man will in the
meanwhile remove the items for which the police have proba-
ble cause to search.
Justice White thus asserted that an arrest, based on probable
cause, almost always creates the potential for loss of evidence, and
therefore presumptively produces exigent circumstances justifying
a warrantless search.29 Under this line of analysis, the protective
sweep, as it is incident to an arrest based on probable cause, would
be per se constitutional.
The Court rejected Justice White's argument in Vale v. Loui-
siana.30 There, the police had placed Donald Vale's house under
surveillance and had obtained a warrant for his arrest on suspicion
of trafficking narcotics. After observing an apparent exchange of
narcotics between a known addict and Vale outside the house, the
officers arrested Vale on his front steps. Without a warrant, the
police then conducted a cursory search of Vale's home to see if a
third party was present.3 1 While the police did so, Vale's mother
and brother returned to the house. Still lacking a warrant, the law
enforcement agents then conducted a full-scale search which un-
covered narcotics in Donald Vale's bedroom.
The Vale court declined the opportunity to expand Chimel's
grabbing area exception to include all searches for third parties in-
cident to an arrest.32 Justice Stewart, author of both the Vale and
Chimel majority opinions, asserted that the police could have ob-
tained a search warrant in Vale at the same time that they applied
for the arrest warrant. Thus, the majority "decine[d] to hold that
an arrest on the street can provide its own 'exigent circumstance'
so as to justify a warrantless search of the arrestee's house."3 The
opinion did not explicitly deal with the concern that Donald Vale's
mother and brother might have destroyed the evidence if the po-
29 Chimel, 395 U.S. at 774, 781 (White dissenting).
399 U.S. 30 (1970).
31 Vale did not object to this search because it uncovered no evidence.
32 The Court characterized the Chimel "search incident to arrest" rationale as follows:
A search may be incident to an arrest 'only if it is substantially contemporaneous with
the arrest and is confined to the immediate vicinity of the arrest."'. . . If a search of a
house is to be upheld as incident to an arrest, that arrest must take place inside the
house, . not somewhere outside-whether two blocks away,. . twenty feet
away,.. .or on the sidewalk near the front steps.
Id. at 33-34 (citations omitted).
33 Id. at 35.
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lice had withdrawn to obtain a search warrant. But by invalidating
the search, the Court implicitly decided that the abstract threat of
destruction of evidence by third persons could not justify a war-
rantless search. Further, the Court's assertion that an arrest
outside a house cannot justify a warrantless inside-the-house
search incident to arrest indicates that the Court hesitates to ex-
tend the Chimel rationale to all threats to evidence.3 4
Vale did imply, however, that a warrantless search would be
valid if the evidence ultimately seized had been "in the process of
destruction" or was "about to be removed from the jurisdiction" at
the initiation of the search.3 5 The Court would uphold a warrant-
less search under these compelling circumstances as particular
facts justified, but not as a result of a presumption about exigen-
cies stemming from an arrest. Thus, where there is only a possibil-
ity that accomplices might destroy or remove evidence, a search of
a home is not valid merely because there has been an arrest
outside. But Vale left open the question whether the protective
sweep would be authorized where there has been an arrest inside
the arrestee's home.
Regardless of where the arrest took place, Justice Black and
Chief Justice Burger would have upheld the protective sweep in
Vale. Both Justices considered the police actions to be reasonable
in light of the substantial possibility that Donald Vale's mother
and brother would have destroyed the evidence if the police had
left to obtain a search warrant.3 6 The Vale dissenters construed
the abstract danger of destruction of evidence to be an exceptional
circumstance justifying a warrantless search whether the arrest was
inside or outside the premises.
2. Protecting the Safety of the Arresting Officer. Another line
of Supreme Court decisions upholds warrantless arrests and cur-
sory searches carried out in order to protect the safety of the ar-
resting officers. In balancing the privacy interests protected by the
fourth amendment against the risk of physical harm to law en-
forcement officers, the Supreme Court defers to the reasonable be-
liefs of police officers that they can avoid injury through a warrant-
less search. Moreover, the Court has explicitly held that the police
34 The Court pointed out that because the arrest took place outside the house, even the
pre-Chimel Harris-Rabinowitz rule would not cover the search. Id. at 33.
11 "The officers were not responding to an emergency.. . . They were not in hot pursuit
of a fleeing felon .... The goods ultimately seized were not in the process of destruc-
tion .... Nor were they about to be removed from the jurisdiction." Id. at 35 (citations
omitted).
' See id. at 38 (Black dissenting).
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need not make the usual showing of probable cause to search
where officer safety is endangered and where the intrusion is
minimal.
The Court set forth these principles in Terry. The majority
found that a frisk could be constitutionally permissible despite the
lack of probable cause for either a full arrest or a full search.37 The
Court did not rely upon the traditional exigent circumstances ex-
ception to the warrant requirement, which requires a showing of
probable cause. Rather, the Court waived the warrant requirement
altogether because the search was only a "frisk" and because the
risks to the officer were substantial. The Court's inquiry was thus
only into reasonableness, not probable cause.38 As long as an officer
can articulate grounds for initiating the patdown-that is, for be-
lieving that the suspect is armed and dangerous-his actions are
constitutional.3 9 The desire to protect the officer from physical
harm outweighs the intrusion on a citizen's privacy.
Other cases in which the Court has granted police officers the
right to search a limited area to protect their safety include
Chimel," allowing searches of the grabbing area; United States v.
Robinson, 1 authorizing a search of the person of the arrestee inci-
dent to any lawful arrest; and New York v. Belton, 2 upholding
searches of the interior of a car. Although other factors in these
cases contributed to the Court's finding the searches constitu-
tional, these opinions show the Court's strong interest in protect-
ing the police against dangerous suspects. Regardless of whether a
police officer has probable cause to search the targeted area, she
11 The Court stressed both that the search resulted from the officer's justifiable fears
that the defendant might be armed and that the officer's safety might be threatened, and
also that the search was no more intrusive than necessary to uncover weapons. See 392 U.S.
at 27-30.
"I This distinction is important because it is easier for police to show reasonableness
than it is for police to show probable cause. For a discussion of the factors needed for a
showing of reasonableness in the context of sweeps, see notes 104-08 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of probable cause in this context, see notes 116-19 and accompanying
text.
., The Court said,
[I]n determining whether the officer acted reasonably in such circumstances, due
weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'
but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience.
Terry, 392 U.S. at 27.
40 395 U.S. at 752.
41 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
42 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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may do so to ensure her safety.4 3
Yet absent a showing of potential danger, the Court has not
allowed searches of persons incident to the lawful arrest of other
persons. In Ybarra v. Illinois, the police had an arrest warrant for
a bartender suspected of dealing heroin and a search warrant for
his bar. While arresting the bartender, the police frisked all of the
patrons of the bar, including Ybarra, even though the officers had
no reason to suspect that any of the patrons were armed and dan-
gerous. In spite of the warrants to search the bar and arrest the
bartender, the Court declined to admit into evidence packages of
heroin found on Ybarra when he was searched.44 Thus it is impor-
tant to keep in mind that even if police perform a constitutional
protective sweep, they must have some articulable grounds for be-
lieving that a person discovered in the sweep is armed and danger-
ous before they can frisk that person, unless that person is already
subject to lawful arrest.
C. The Court and the Sweep
To date, the Court's only direct treatment of the protective
sweep is in Justices Brennan, White and Marshall's dissent from
denial of certiorari in Vasquez v. United States, 4  a Second Circuit
case upholding a protective sweep. The case involved an arrest
outside the suspect's apartment building, while the police believed
that third parties in the apartment might destroy evidence. Thus
prompted to enter the building without a warrant, the police dis-
43 This is not to suggest that searches occur at will: Chimel requires probable cause to
arrest as a predicate to a grabbing area search; Terry requires reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is armed and dangerous; and both Robinson and Belton require both that probable
cause to arrest exist and that the arrest be custodial.
4 444 U.S. 85 (1979). The question confronting the Court was whether the application
of Ill.Rev.Stat. ch.38, § 108-9 (1975) to the facts of the case violated the fourth and four-
teenth amendments. The statute provides:
In the execution of the warrant the person executing the same may reasonably detain
to search any person in the place at the time:
(a) To protect himself from attack, or
(b) To prevent the disposal or concealment of any instruments, articles or things
particularly described in the warrant.
The Court held that the law "falls within the category of statutes purporting to authorize
searches without probable cause, which the Court has not hesitated to hold invalid as au-
thority for unconstitutional searches." Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 96 n.11. While the Illinois statute
did not explicitly authorize protective sweeps-presumably, officers would have had to ob-
tain custody of the other individuals by some other means before turning to § 108-9's rules
governing these detentions-it is instructive that the Court did not read into the arrest
context a per se rule of exigency, which the dissent pressed. See id. at 96-98 (Burger dissent-
ing); id. at 107-08 (Rehnquist dissenting).
15 638 F.2d 507 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 975 (1981).
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covered contraband in the suspect's apartment. The Justices be-
lieved Vasquez presented an unreasonable exception to the war-
rant requirement, as its sweep doctrine
would allow warrantless entry into a home following an arrest
outside, if the arresting officers possess a reasonable belief
that third persons are inside and aware of the arrest, "so that
they might destroy evidence." The exception thus stated not
only authorized the police to enter a home without a warrant
in circumstances far less compelling than we have recognized,
but permits law officers, in determining the time and manner
of executing an arrest, to contrive their own exigency and
thereby avoid the necessity of procuring a warrant before en-
tering the home.48
The Justices also objected to the lack of probable cause.4 7 In
their view, a search based on "nothing more than the officers' 'rea-
sonable belief that there were additional persons in the apartment
who were aware of [Vasquez's] arrest" was an unreasonable war-
rantless invasion of the premises. The dissenters concluded,
"[d]espite the currency of the doctrine in the lower courts, no deci-
sion of this Court supports the existence of a general 'security
check' exception to the warrant requirement.
4 8
II. INCONSISTENT TREATMENT OF THE PROTECTIVE SWEEP By THE
CIRCUIT COURTS
The protective sweep doctrine is young. Before the Chimel de-
cision in 1969, the courts never confronted the issue of whether
police could sweep the premises for third parties who might de-
stroy evidence or harm the arresting officers. Under the Harris-
Rabinowitz rule, police had authority to conduct a full-scale search
of the entire premises incident to any lawful arrest therein. The
Supreme Court's Chimel decision, however, limited the search inci-
46 Vasquez, 454 U.S. at 983 (Brennan dissenting from denial of certiorari). Justice
Brennan's dissent prompted a response from Justice Stevens, who argued that Brennan's
characterization of the lower court's opinion was not fair. See id. at 977 n.4.
11 It is noteworthy that Justice White concurred with the Brennan dissent, particularly
since Justice White's Chimel dissent had argued that every arrest creates exigent circum-
stances sufficient to justify a warrantless search. This suggests either that Justice White's
views have changed, or that the cases are distinguishable (Chimel's arrest was inside,
whereas Vasquez's was outside), or that White simply thinks the Court should have granted
certiorari. The last alternative seems least likely because White could have dissented from
the denial of certiorari without joining the Brennan opinion.
418 Id. at 987.
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dent to arrest to the arrestee's grabbing area, and, in response, the
lower courts created the protective sweep exception to redress the
difficulties imposed by the warrant requirement in situations
where third parties pose an immediate threat to law enforcement.
Although the protective sweep exception is widely established,
it is not well-delineated. From circuit to circuit, there is no consis-
tent or meaningful standard to distinguish between a valid and an
unlawful sweep. As the Ninth Circuit observed. in United States v.
Wiga, "[w]hile nearly all of our fellow circuits have endorsed [pro-
tective sweeps], there is considerable disagreement over the degree
of reasonable suspicion necessary to justify a sweep of the prem-
ises. ''9 Until the Supreme Court rules on the protective sweep, the
lower courts are left largely without guidance.
A. Sweeps to Preserve Evidence
With respect to the evidentiary prong of the sweep, circuits
have adopted various standards for judging between valid and in-
valid searches. These standards range along a continuum from re-
quiring certain destruction of evidence to accepting an abstract
threat of destruction, absent even probable cause to search for the
evidence.
In validating protective sweeps, the Fifth, Sixth and Ninth
Circuits apply a pragmatic "now or never" standard. Under this
rule, where a police officer has probable cause to search for evi-
dence but believes the evidence will be lost if she abandons her
search to obtain a warrant, the courts consider an immediate, lim-
ited search for people capable of destroying the evidence permissi-
ble under the fourth amendment.
Operating under this standard, the Sixth Circuit in United
States v. Elkins approved a protective sweep of the arrestee El-
kins' premises conducted after a police officer witnessed Elkins'
girlfriend dump cocaine into a commode. The court elaborated,
warrantless entry will be sustained when the circumstances
then extant were such as to lead a person of reasonable cau-
tion to conclude that evidence of a federal crime would proba-
bly be found on the premises and also that such evidence
would probably be destroyed within the time necessary to ob-
tain a search warrant.50
49 662 F.2d 1325, 1330 (9th Cir. 1981).
50 732 F.2d 1280, 1284 (6th Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927,
948 (6th Cir. 1984), in which the court held that police officers could:
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The court upheld the sweep of Elkins' entire home.
The Ninth Circuit likewise considers a protective sweep justi-
fiable only "[w]hen police officers, acting on probable cause and in
good faith reasonably believe from the totality of the circum-
stances that... evidence or contraband will imminently be de-
stroyed."51 In United States v. Driver, the government argued that
the police had probable cause to believe that heroin smugglers, one
of whom was Driver, had detected their undercover investigation;
however, there were no facts to support this contention. Rather,
according to the court, the smugglers had not suspected that there
was an informant present, they were not behaving unusually, and
the police had had ample time to obtain a search warrant. The
Ninth Circuit thus held that the assumptions about the likelihood
of imminent destruction of the evidence were too speculative to
justify the warrantless entry.52
The First and Seventh Circuits endorse a slightly weaker stan-
dard: probable cause to search coupled with a substantial risk of
destruction of evidence. As the First Circuit set forth in United
States v. Veillette, so long as police officers have probable cause to
search, and they also believe that there is a "great likelihood" of
destruction of evidence, then they may forego the warrant require-
ment.53 The court did not uphold the Veillette sweep because the
conclude reasonably that [a confederate] had returned from Florida that every [sic]
day with a quantity of cocaine and was in the process of distributing it to the known
narcotics traffickers and others entering and exiting his apartment. The conclusion that
evidence, that is, cocaine, was actually being 'lost' through distribution before their
very eyes justified the officer's belief that exigent circumstances existed.
51 United States v. Driver, 776 F.2d 807, 810 .(9th Cir. 1985) (emphasis added), citing
United States v. Kunkler, 679 F.2d 187, 191-92 (9th Cir. 1982). For other Ninth Circuit
examples see United States v. Wulferdinger, 782 F.2d 1473, 1476 (9th Cir. 1986) (allowing a
warrantless search only if there was probable cause to believe that occupants would destroy
evidence before a search warrant could be obtained); United States v. Hicks, 752 F.2d 379,
383-84 (9th Cir. 1985) ("there was probable cause to believe that there were persons within
the Hicks residence who would destroy .. cocaine" left on the premises); United States v.
Johnson, 660 F.2d 749, 752 (9th Cir. 1981), quoting United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906,
909 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Exigent circumstances are those in which a substantial risk of harm to
the persons involved or to the law enforcement process would arise if the police were to
delay a search until a warrant could be obtained"); United States v. Hackett, 638 F.2d 1179,
1182-86 (9th Cir. 1980) (warrantless sweep of premises valid after narcotics dealer's discdv-
ery of transmitter concealed in contraband).
The Fifth Circuit also applies a "now or never" standard. See United States v. Thomp-
son, 700 F.2d 944, 947-49 (5th Cir. 1983).
5' Driver, 776 F.2d at 811.
The Fifth Circuit has invalidated searches on the same grounds. See United States v.
Congote, 656 F.2d 971, 974 n.2 (5th Cir. 1981) (mere possibility of the destruction of evi-
dence does not qualify as an exigent circumstance).
" United States v. Veillette, 778 F.2d 899, 902 (lst Cir. 1985). See also United States v.
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district court had merely "speculated on various possibilities that
might have given the police 'reason to believe' that exigent circum-
stances existed. ' 54 Although the court admitted the seized evi-
dence on other grounds, 55 the case indicates that the First Circuit-
will validate a protective sweep only if officers can demonstrate a
great likelihood that evidence will be destroyed.
The decisions above rest on a showing of probable cause plus a
degree of certainty that evidence would be, as opposed to might be,
destroyed if the police officer had to obtain a warrant. Other cir-
cuits impose less rigorous fourth amendment constraints on arrest-
ing officers. For example, the Fourth Circuit has found that "when
officers have probable cause to believe that contraband is present,
and, in addition, they reasonably believe that the evidence may be
destroyed or removed before they can secure a search warrant, a
warrantless entry is justified."56 Unlike the First, Fifth, Sixth, Sev-
enth, and Ninth Circuits, the Fourth Circuit does not require law
enforcement officers to show that evidence will probably be de-
stroyed, only that it may be destroyed. The Second and Tenth Cir-
cuits have adopted this same position.
57
Moore, 790 F.2d 13, 15 (1st Cir. 1986) (upholding a warrantless search based upon a high
risk that a confederate would flee or destroy evidence when a recently arrested dealer did
not return with the proceeds from a narcotics transaction; "exigent circumstances exist
when government agents reasonably believe that evidence will be destroyed or a suspect will
flee if an immediate entry is not made"); United States v. Baldacchino, 762 F.2d 170, 176-78
(1st Cir. 1985) (employing great likelihood standard).
For examples from the Seventh Circuit, see United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311 (7th
Cir. 1987) ("Exigent circumstances exist where the police have an objective and reasonable
fear that evidence is about to be destroyed"); United States v. Altman, 797 F.2d 514, 515
(7th Cir. 1986) (upholding a protective sweep based upon the "serious risk that evidence
would be destroyed").
Veillette, 778 F.2d at 903.
See id. at 903-04.
" United States v. Turner, 650 F.2d 526, 528 (4th Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
17 For examples from the Second Circuit, see United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860,
869 (2d Cir. 1981) (where "officers had a legitimate basis for believing there were other
persons inside the apartment who were likely to be aware of the arrest and therefore might
destroy evidence in the apartment, a warrantless entry into, and security check of the apart-
ment [was] permissible") (emphasis added); Vasquez, 638 F.2d at 531 (authorizing protec-
tive sweeps where officers have reason to believe that third persons were aware of an arrest
outside the premises and that they might destroy evidence).
For examples from the Tenth Circuit, see United States v. Mabry, 809 F.2d 671, 678-80
(10th Cir. 1987) (upholding sweeps based upon probable cause and exigent circumstances;
exigent circumstances include situations where drug dealers might destroy evidence if their
runners do not return from drug sale promptly); United States v. Cuaron, 700 F.2d 582, 586
(10th Cir. 1983) ("When officers have reason to believe that criminal evidence may be de-
stroyed,. . or removed,. . before a warrant can be obtained, the circumstances are consid-
ered sufficiently critical to permit [a warrantless sweep].")(emphasis added).
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B. Protective Sweeps For Safety
Safety sweeps address a different and more severe threat than
evidentiary sweeps, and therefore safety searches often require a
lesser quantum of certainty before they may be lawfully initiated. 8
Some courts, relying on Terry, apply a reasonable suspicion test,
wherein police officers need only demonstrate grounds to suspect
that third parties on the property might imperil public safety. As
the Tenth Circuit explained in United States v. Owens, "'[w]hen
officers have arrested a person inside his residence, the exigent cir-
cumstances exception permits a protective search of part or all of
the residence when the officers reasonably believe that there might
be other persons on the premises who could pose some danger to
them.' ,o Although the officer's suspicions must be based upon ob-
jective articulable facts, these facts generally are not hard to
show. e° Where police officer safety is thought to be in jeopardy,
courts frequently uphold a protective sweep on a lesser showing of
certainty than that required when officers engage in protective
sweeps in order to protect evidence.
Even in the context of officer safety, however, some courts re-
quire a higher showing of exigency than a mere reasonable suspi-
cion of the presence of a third person. In United States v.
Kolodziej, for example, the Fifth Circuit concluded, "[a] cursory
safety 'check is permissible 'when the circumstances provide, at the
11 For example, see the dissenting opinion in Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 592 and n.3 (Kelly
dissenting) ("reason to believe" test is too speculative for exigencies relating to preservation
of evidence, but it might be appropriate in the officer safety context).
59 782 F.2d 146, 151 (10th Cir. 1986), quoting United States v. Riccio, 726 F.2d 638, 641
(10th Cir. 1984). The court found, however, that the only person suspected to be present on
the premises, a sleeping naked woman, posed no reasonable danger to the armed officers.
0 See, for example, United States v. Valles-Valencia, 811 F.2d 1232, 1236 (9th Cir.
1987) (neighbor's report about third parties in area, along with the belief that these suspects
were armed, gave officers reasonable belief they might be in danger); United States v. Stan-
dridge, 810 F.2d 1034, 1037 (11th Cir. 1987) (upholding sweep following arrest of armed and
dangerous bank robber "so long as there is uncertainty as to whether there might be others
present"); United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439 (4th Cir. 1985) (reasonable suspiscion
that conspirator was present in marijuana fields after police helicopter surveillance spotted
a third adult who was unaccounted for); United States v. Irizarry, 673 F.2d 554, 558 (1st Cir.
1982) (reasonable suspicion that fourth person was present in hotel room after three others,
one of whom was armed, had emerged from it); United States v. Bruton, 647 F.2d 818, 822-
23 (8th Cir. 1981) (finding reasonable suspicion based on Bruton's previous conviction for
illegal possession of firearms, and a belief that some of his confederates may have been in
the vicinity). The Bruton dissent points out, however, that the majority failed to consider
that the policemen did not assume positions of safety, but actually had gathered around a
window of Bruton's trailer. This suggested to the dissent that the officers did not fear an
armed accomplice within. See id. at 829 (Lay concurring and dissenting).
See also the cases cited in United States v. Hill, 730 F.2d 1163, 1169-70 (8th Cir. 1984).
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least, probable cause to believe that a serious threat to safety is
presented.'" Arresting officers "must 'have reasonable grounds to
believe that there are other persons present inside who might pre-
sent a security risk.' "81 Relying on Kolodziej, the Sixth Circuit has
required the "government [to] show that there was 'a serious and
demonstrable potentiality for danger' ,,e2 before upholding a war-
rantless search.
C. Confusion Within The Lower Courts
The above discussion demonstrates that the circuits disagree
about what constitutes legitimate grounds to uphold a protective
sweep in the context both of preserving evidence and of protecting
officer safety. 3 Worse yet, individual circuits jumble the doctrines
by using safety standards in evidence cases, treating safety and ev-
identiary sweeps alike, or announcing standards but not applying
them correctly to the facts at hand. It is particularly troubling to
find conflicting standards within a single decision. When an opin-
ion proffers several incongruent criteria for justifying a protective
sweep, it fails to serve as a coherent guide to police officers. The
recent decision in United States v. Jones" demonstrates the point.
From inside their hotel room, Jones and Nisbet had attempted to
resist the police. During the struggle one of them fired a shotgun.
After arresting them, the police searched the adjoining rooms for
61 706 F.2d at 597, 596 quoting United States v. Cravero, 545 F.2d 406, 418 (5th Cir.
1976) and United States v. Sheikh, 654 F.2d 1057, 1071 (5th Cir. 1981).
11 United States v. Morgan, 743 F.2d 1158, 1163 (6th Cir. 1984), quoting Kolodziej, 706
F.2d at 596. The police officers in Morgan were on the trail of the defendant after he had
been target shooting in a public park. But because the police could not show that Morgan
represented "an immediate threat to the arresting officers or the public," the court disal-
lowed a warrantless search of Morgan's residence following his arrest outside. Morgan, 743
F.2d at 1162-63.
For a case applying looser language but reaching the same result, see United States v.
Hatcher, 680 F.2d 438, 444 (6th Cir. 1982).
63 To add yet another standard, albeit one not yet applied to protective sweeps, a few
decisions have introduced the concept of "mild exigency" to authorize an arresting officer to
enter a premises without waiting for a response to her knock on the door. When police have
knocked and properly announced their identity and purpose, mild exigency justifies simulta-
neous entry when entry can be accomplished without destruction of property. "Mild exi-
gency may exist where there is a likelihood that the occupants will try to escape, resist or
destroy evidence." United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984) (en
banc). See also Hicks, 752 F.2d at 383. This emerging tepid urgency exception presupposes
probable cause.
696 F.2d 479 (7th Cir. 1982). See also Hicks, 752 F.2d at 384 (upholding sweep, men-
tioning both "mild exigency" and "probable cause to believe that there was a fair
probability that any cocaine in the Hicks' residence would be destroyed in absence of swift
action").
1988]
The University of Chicago Law Review
dangerous persons. The court upheld the sweep as falling within
the "boundaries.. .established in Chimel.. .and its progeny." In
the court's view, "[t]he police may search adjoining rooms to look
for possibly dangerous persons." This would imply that protective
sweeps are per se justifiable when incident to arrest. But the court
also alluded to the possibility that the protective sweep was not "a
search at all" because it was only for people and lasted less than 90
seconds. And finally, the court concluded that protective sweeps
are legitimate where "necessary to assure [officer] safety," as deter-
mined on a "good reason to believe" basis. 5
It is similarly difficult to discern a legal framework in opinions
which enunciate high standards of exigency without actually ap-
plying those criteria to the case at hand.6 6 This practice also
defeats the purpose of the exclusionary rule: deterring police mis-
conduct. For example, in United States v. Tabor, the police had
obtained a warrant to search Tabor's house for bookmaking para-
phernalia, but they had no warrant to search Tabor's unattached
barn. After concluding that the state had the burden of proving an
11 Jones, 696 F.2d at 487 and n.9.
"' Consider United States v. Muhammad, 658 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1981), where the
court upheld a warrantless search of the trunk of an alleged bank robber's car on the basis
of the officer's suspicions that a dangerous accomplice might be hidden within. The officers
conducted this search several hours after impounding the car. The Muhammad dissent bit-
terly objected:
The police must also have at least reasonable factual grounds for a suspicion that an
armed person is hiding in the trunk in order to create the kind of exigency which would
justify the by-passing of the Fourth Amendment dictates to permit a warrantless
search of the trunk.
The dissent pointed out that the officers did not behave as if they actually feared an armed
accomplice within the trunk. Id. at 256 (Murnaghan dissenting).
See also Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 590 (upholding sweep to preserve evidence even though
officers had waited one hour before entry); Bruton, 647 F.2d at 823 (validating a protective
sweep based on an officer's "suspicion" that an armed accomplice was nearby; police officer's
behavior indicated no fear of attack). The dissent in Bruton commented on the irony of the
holding:
Under Steagald [v. United States], [451 U.S. 204 (1981),] officers with a warrant for [a
confederate's] arrest could not conduct a warrantless search of [the defendant's] home.
They could, however, conduct the same warrantless search simply by asserting a belief
that [the confederate] was a dangerous accomplice who might be lurking in [the de-
fendant's] home.
Bruton, 647 F.2d at 830 (Lay concurring and dissenting).
See also United States v. Korman, 614 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding the following
facts significant to validate sweep to prevent the imminent destruction of cocaine: several
cars in driveway indicated someone in addition to Korman was home; possibility that Kor-
man used counter-surveillance techniques; evidence easily disposable).
Many of these cases also raise the problems of police-created exigencies and the failure
to use telephonic warrants when time permits. For a discussion of these issues, see note 122
and accompanying text.
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exceptional situation meriting a warrantless search of the barn, the
court required the officers to show that their suspicions of danger
were clear and reasonable: "Officers of the law are not given free
reign to conduct sweep searches on the pretense that a dangerous
situation might be imminent." Nonetheless, the court validated the
warrantless search on the basis of rather innocuous facts: there
were miscellaneous cars in the driveway, Tabor owned a revolver,
and his dog was "agitated. 6 7 It remains unclear what Tabor's legal
standard is when the court fails to apply the announced standard
to the facts of the case.
Moreover, while purporting to make individual determinations
of the need to search, lower courts frequently treat protective
sweeps initiated to preserve safety and evidence as identical, al-
though fourth amendment jurisprudence counsels against this con-
fluence. Reasoning that privacy interests are less compelling where
life is jeopardized, courts have traditionally interpreted the fourth
amendment to require a lesser showing of danger to justify war-
rantless searches of a home where police officers initiate the search
in order to protect officer or public safety rather than to prevent
the destruction of evidence."e Nonetheless, many opinions lump
the two possible motives for the warrantless search into one undif-
ferentiated category-the protective sweep-as if both bases for
the search were of equal urgency. 9
The consequence of using the same standard in both instances
67 722 F.2d 596, 598 (10th Cir. 1983).
68 For further discussion of this topic see Section III-B below.
" For Second Circuit examples, see Martino, 664 F.2d at 869 ("when law enforcement
officers have lawfully entered premises to effect an arrest, they are entitled to make a quick
and limited 'security check' of the premises to be sure there are no third persons present
who might destroy evidence or pose a safety threat to the officers"); United States v. Segura,
663 F.2d 411, 413 (2d Cir. 1981) (adopting uniform standard authorizing protective sweeps
"to ensure that no one else was present who might constitute a threat to [police] safety or
destroy evidence"); Vasquez, 638 F.2d at 530 ("When police officers have lawfully entered
premises to effect an arrest, they are entitled to make a 'quick and limited pass through the
premises to check for third persons who may destroy evidence or pose a threat to officers'"
quoting United States v. Gomez, 633 F.2d 999, 1008 (2d Cir. 1980)).
The Ninth Circuit too has articulated a single standard for showings of need for both
kinds of sweeps. See, for example, Driver, 776 F.2d at 810; United States v. Alfonso, 759
F.2d 728, 743 (9th Cir. 1984); McConney, 728 F.2d at 1199 (defining "exigent circumstances
as those circumstances that would cause a reasonable person to believe that entry (or other
relevant prompt action) was necessary to prevent physical harm to the officers or other per-
sons, the destruction of relevant evidence, the escape of the suspect, or some other conse-
quence improperly frustrating legitimate law enforcement efforts"); Kunkler, 679 F.2d at
191-92; Johnson, 660 F.2d at 752.
To the same effect, see Elkins, 732 F.2d at 1284-85; United States v. Blasco, 702 F.2d
1315, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 1983).
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is that protective sweeps for evidence are upheld under a safety
standard, instead of being struck down as violating the fourth
amendment for insufficient cause to search. When the two stan-
dards are coalesced, only the less restrictive one bars intrusive
searches. When courts loosely define the law or when they leni-
ently apply nebulous standards to the given facts, the state has the
opportunity to fit what would otherwise be an unlawful search into
the protective sweep exception.
Perhaps those circuits that treat all protective sweeps alike
wish to create a new exception to the warrant requirement based
upon the limited search rationale: The Protective Sweep For Peo-
ple, Not Things. Such a bright-line rule would be an extension of
the Chimel exception, in that a search only for people would be a
reasonable response to the presumptive threats posed by those
persons."0 The arresting officer would always have a right to look
for people, just as she already has the right to search the arrestee's
grabbing area.
But if this is what the courts want to accomplish, they are not
explicit about it. Rather, their opinions purport to proceed accord-
ing to traditional individual determinations of need to search.71
For example, a Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Brock,
considered exigent circumstances to be present "when there is 'a
substantial risk of harm to the persons involved or to the law en-
forcement process. . .if the police. . .delay a search ... .
Whether out of confusion, convenience, or lack of careful consider-
ation, these circuit courts fail to account for distinctions between
safety and evidentiary concerns.
The lower courts' disarray over the treatment of protective
sweeps not only demonstrates poor adjudication, but is highly
counterproductive. If the courts are responsible for striking the
proper balance between privacy and law enforcement, they need to
establish clear standards for lawful sweeps, and to enforce the
standards through the exclusionary rule. But when the standards
are unclear, the exclusionary rule cannot deter offensive police con-
duct. Faced with uncertain rules, police are left to their intuitive
sense of propriety in restraining investigatory impulses. Police of-
70 One district court decision has employed this reasoning. See United States v. Remy,
658 F.Supp. 661, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1987): "When police officers have made a lawful arrest, they
may make a cursory security sweep of the premises in which the arrest took place."
71 See notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
72 667 F.2d 1311, 1318 (9th Cir. 1982), quoting United States v. Gardner, 627 F.2d 906,
909 (9th Cir. 1980).
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ficers thus may initiate warrantless searches under less-than-com-
pelling circumstances. 7 3
The fourth amendment was designed to interpose a magistrate
between the people and the state to guard against precisely these
kinds of arbitrary intrusions on privacy. The ambiguities in the law
governing protective sweeps call for resolution. The discussion of
the preceding sections makes plain several such ambiguities. There
is no consensus about whether officers should possess probable
cause to believe, or a mere suspicion, that there are third persons
on the premises who could endanger the law enforcement process
before initiating a sweep. The requisite degree of certainty might
depend on whether the risk entails destruction of evidence or a
threat to officer safety. Moreover, there is little agreement on
whether the threat to destruction of evidence must be imminent or
possible. Finally, it is uncertain whether police should be able to
conduct a sweep of the premises regardless of whether the justify-
ing arrest has occurred inside the premises, or outside or nearby
the premises.
III. DEVELOPING A COHERENT PROTECTIVE SWEEP DOCTRINE
To resolve the protective sweep debate, one must decide which
of two alternatives is better: extension of the Chimel and Terry per
se exceptions to the warrant requirement, or individual determina-
tions of exigent circumstances. Both lines of analysis produce a co-
herent protective sweep doctrine that police could understand and
courts could administer. For lawful arrests occurring within the ar-
restee's premises, the extension of Chimel and Terry results in a
bright-line rule granting police the authority to conduct a cursory
search incident to arrest for people, not things. On the other hand,
application of the traditional exigent circumstance exception calls
for a two-prong test, wherein the first step is to determine whether
the officers fear that delay will jeopardize their safety or threaten
the destruction of evidence. If the concern is for safety, police need
only have a reasonable suspicion that an armed and dangerous
third party is present. If the concern is for evidence, fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence requires that the police demonstrate probable
cause to believe that evidence is in danger of imminent destruc-
7 On the other hand, without well-delineated principles, police might refrain from con-
ducting a justifiable protective sweep for fear that the trial court will exclude any evidence
seized during the check. Although this possibility is remote, nevertheless, public safety
could be endangered or the apprehension of criminal suspects could be unreasonably cur-
tailed without clear rules.
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tion. These alternative models give coherence to the protective
sweep doctrine. This comment will consider each in greater depth.
A. Extending Chimel and Terry: The Protective Sweep As a Le-
gitimate Search Incident to Arrest
Chimel and Terry serve as a starting point from which to cre-
ate another bright-line exception to the warrant and probable
cause requirement: the protective sweep. In Chimel, the Supreme
Court decided that an arrestee has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the area within his immediate control at the time of his
arrest. In authorizing a warrantless search of the grabbing area,
Chimel did not differentiate between invading privacy for safety or
evidentiary reasons.74 Hence, Chimel may authorize protective
sweeps for people incident to any arrest, sweeps designed either to
protect safety or to preserve evidence.
Lower courts have already expanded Chimel's grabbing area
beyond an arrestee's reach. For example, in United States v. Pat-
terson, although an arresting officer stood between Patterson and a
kitchen shelf six feet away from her, the court considered the shelf
to be within her reach.75 Likewise, in People v. Perry, the court
ruled that the police could introduce evidence found in the defend-
ant's desk, even though the handcuffed defendant stood in an adja-
cent corridor at the time of the search, because the desk was
within the defendant's grabbing area at the time of his arrest.7 6
These decisions go far in guarding against dangers posed by the
arrestee.
Similarly, Terry provides that police can act to protect them-
selves against suspicious persons. The Terry Court made clear that
police can make a measured response to a suspected threat." Yet
Terry and Chimel do not explicitly address threats created by
third persons who might be lurking on the premises. To guard
against the risk to the lives of police officers or against the irre-
trievable loss of evidence, the Court could extend the Chimel and
Terry exceptions to take into account- the threat created by con-
federates. After all, a party hidden from the police will often be in
a better position to resist the arrest, to harm law enforcers, or to
7" Although safety concerns may have prompted the decision, Chimel allows police to
search for and seize any evidence or weapons that are found within the grabbing area of the
arrestee. See note 21 and accompanying text.
75 447 F.2d 424, 426 (10th Cir. 1971).
7 266 N.E.2d 330, 333 (Ill. 1971).
71 See notes 23-25 and accompanying text.
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destroy evidence than the suspect who is already under police con-
trol. Like the grabbing area and stop-and-frisk exceptions, the pro-
tective sweep exception would seek to prevent persons from de-
stroying evidence or endangering police safety.
One can also justify the sweep exception under Supreme Court
decisions which uphold warrantless searches where the invasion of
privacy is deemed "minimal" in relation to the need to search.
Chimel and Terry demonstrate that the Court will sanction a no-
more-intrusive-than-necessary search in order to protect safety.
Because the protective sweep is only for people, is cursory, and is
conducted only when the police are already lawfully inside the ar-
restee's premises, it can be considered only an additional minimal
invasion. Safety concerns should trump the "slight additional in-
trusion on [a] defendant['s]. . . privacy, already significantly re-
duced by his arrest."7 8 Further, because the sweep is limited in
scope and short in duration, it does not represent the rebirth of the
Harris-Rabinowitz rule which permitted a full scale search of the
home incident to a lawful arrest.
Neither Chimel nor Terry require arresting officers to have
probable cause to search the excepted area. Although Terry re-
quires the officer to possess articulable suspicions before con-
ducting a stop and a frisk, Chimel does not require arresting of-
ficers to have even a hunch that the arrestee might be armed or
about to destroy evidence. Regardless of whether the police officer
has reason to believe that she needs to search immediately, she
may search under Chimel's bright-line exception to the warrant re-
quirement in order to provide safety or protect evidence.
In both Terry and Chimel, there were Justices who argued
that every arrest presents a risk of danger, and therefore warrant-
less searches incident to arrests should be presumed reasonable.7
Courts might authorize protective sweeps under the same pre-
sumption. If officers had to hesitate-either to obtain a warrant, or
to determine whether they had a lawful reason to believe evidence
might be imminently destroyed, or to consider whether they had
reason to suspect that their safety might be endangered-they
could lose the opportunity to reduce the risks facing them. Thus
78 Hatcher, 680 F.2d at 451 (Kennedy dissenting).
79 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 24; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 773 (White dissenting). See also Wash-
ington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 7 (1982): "Every arrest must be presumed to present a risk
of danger to the arresting officer."
8o See United States v. Agapito, 620 F.2d 324, 336 (2d Cir. 1980): "The delay attendant
,upon obtaining a warrant could enable accomplices lurking in another room to destroy evi-
dence. More important, the safety of the arresting officers or members of the public may be
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argued, the sweep is so important that it is a per se reasonable
exercise of law enforcement.
In a separate but related context, the Court recently has
demonstrated its preference for a per se exception to the warrant
requirement for searches incident to arrest. In New York v. Belton,
the Court upheld the search of an automobile passenger compart-
ment conducted after arresting officers had removed all of the pas-
sengers from the vehicle. After recognizing that the "passenger
compartment of an automobile [is] in fact generally, even if not
inevitably, within 'the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or an evidentiary ite[m],' "I" the Court cre-
ated a bright-line rule: police may search the entire passenger com-
partment of a car incident to the lawful arrest of any of the pas-
sengers within the vehicle.
It may be argued that the Court's conclusion in Belton strains
Chimel, in that the Court authorizes searches in areas where no
passenger can or could reach. Although the Court's holding is lim-
ited to automobile searches, Belton may indicate the Court's desire
to provide officers with clear rules even if it must stretch existing
doctrine to do so. On the other hand, a number of factors irrele-
vant to protective sweeps may have influenced the Court's decision
in Belton. First, the Court sought to resolve a conflict among many
courts over how Chimel related to the so-called automobile excep-
tion to the warrant requirement.2 Second, any exception relating
to cars is inherently narrow and easily confined; thus, cars lend
themselves to bright-line rules.8 s Finally, the Court had recognized
previously that privacy interests in a car are less compelling than
privacy interests in a home.8 Thus the Court's willingness to adopt
a bright-line rule for car searches does not necessarily indicate that
the Court would favor this approach in the context of private
dwellings.
Nonetheless, if the Court were to establish a new exception to
the warrant requirement-the Protective Sweep For Persons Ex-
ception-the Court then would have to determine when the excep-
tion could be applied. In Payton v. New York, the Supreme Court
established that, absent exigent circumstances, the police may not
jeopardized." (emphasis added).
"' 453 U.S. at 460, quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763.
82 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 459, 462 n.6.
11 For example, in Belton the Court declined to extend its rule to searches of car
trunks. See id. at 460 n.4.
' See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48-51 (1970).
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enter a private home to make a warrantless arrest. The Court ex-
plained that entry into a private home is an extreme intrusion, and
that entry for the purpose of making an arrest is nearly as intru-
sive as an entry for a search.85 Similarly, in Steagald v. United
States, the Court held that, absent compelling circumstances, the
police may not enter one person's private dwelling to arrest a third
party, even if the police have an arrest warrant.8
Payton and Steagald thus limit the coverage of the would-be
protective sweep exception. Unless there are exigent circum-
stances, a protective sweep would be constitutional only when a
person who lives on the premises is arrested in those premises pur-
suant to a warrant. An arrest with or without a warrant on the
front porch, for example, would not support a protective sweep of
the house. One can propose numerous permutations, all of which
reveal that the supposed bright-line is rather fuzzy. One of the
benefits of a clear exception to the warrant requirement is that it
serves as a good guide for police. As Justice Stewart notes, it is
presumptuous and self-defeating for law makers to create exacting
legal standards that are not only difficult for judges to construe in
the peace and quiet of their chambers, but virtually impossible for
police officers to follow in the volatile environment of the streets.8
Further, straightforward rules better serve the deterrence rationale
of the exclusionary rule. It makes little sense to exclude evidence
on the grounds of an unconstitutional search if the officer, for lack
of understanding or time, could not adhere to a complex legal stan-
dard. The officer would make the same or a similar mistake again,
regardless of whether the court excludes the evidence at trial.
Despite its apparent simplicity, the bright-line protective
sweep exception has its own complexities. First, not only will police
officers have to remember that, absent exigent circumstances, the
exception applies only to arrests within the arrestee's premises,
but application of these particulars will produce arbitrary results.
An arrest in a doorway can trigger a sweep, for example, whereas
an arrest on a porch cannot. The dangers and risks created by hid-
85 445 U.S. 573, 589-90 (1980).
36 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
'7 See Belton, 453 U.S. at 458, 459-60. As Professor LaFave has commented, the fourth
amendment should not have" 'all of the character and consistency of a Rorschach blot.'...
[I]t is extremely important that Fourth Amendment doctrine be expressed in terms under-
standable to the police ... ." Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect
World: On Drawing "Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 307, 321, 333 (1982),
quoting Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn.L.Rev.
349, 375 (1974).
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den third parties in each case, however, will be equal.
Second, the rule would be quite narrow in its operation. There
will be many instances where police will not have an arrest war-
rant, or where the arrest will occur outside a non-arrestee's prem-
ises. In these situations, police officers could not rely on the excep-
tion, but would have to weigh all of the circumstances-not just
the facts of the arrest's location-under traditional fourth amend-
ment criteria to determine whether a protective sweep would be
constitutional. The suggested bright-line exception thus may not
result in significant administrative savings for the courts or the ar-
resting officers. Both would have to be familiar with two sets of
rules. One could propose expanding the sweep exception to encom-
pass warrantless arrests outside of non-arrestees' premises, but
that rule would not withstand fourth amendment scrutiny. In
Vale, the Court was unwilling to broaden the area which may be
searched incident to arrest, perhaps out of a fear that it could not
contain such an expansion in future cases. In striking down a pro-
tective sweep based on a destruction-of-evidence argument, one
court explained, "[tlhere is almost always a partisan who might
destroy or conceal evidence. Under the government's theory, if a
man were arrested in New York, it would be perfectly reasonable
to search his home in California to prevent his wife's destruction of
evidence." 88 The courts have recognized that at some point the dis-
tance between the place of the arrest and the place of subsequent
search becomes so great that a sweep is unconstitutional. Rather
than engage in an endless debate over what that distance is,89 the
courts seem to have drawn the line at the front door-thus fore-
closing the possibility of extending the proposed sweep exception
to areas outside the dwelling.
Third, it is important to bear in mind that the "minimal in-
trusion" of sweeps may not be so minimal after all. Chimel held
the practice of routine warrantless searches of the arrestee's prem-
ises unconstitutional. Protective sweeps incident to arrest threaten
to undermine this decision. To argue that a sweep is only a mini-
mal invasion of privacy assumes the conclusion. Just because a
search is not full-scale does not make the invasion less intrusive.90
8 Davis v. United States, 423 F.2d 974, 979 (5th Cir. 1970).
89 See notes 75-76 and accompanying text for a discussion of a similar inability to ra-
tionally define "grabbing area" in cases following Chimel.
90 A police invasion into the privacy of the home cannot be lightly dismissed as "mini-
mal." "At the very core [of the fourth amendment] stands the right... to retreat into [the]
home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." Silverman v. United
States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). The Court in Terry explicitly rejected "the notions that the
[55:684
Clean Sweeps
Moreover, it is difficult to argue that a police inspection of every
room of a home "just for people" is not invasive. This is a substan-
tial invasion of privacy, and grave consequences may ensue since
the protective sweep will operate in conjunction with the plain
view doctrine.
Fourth, the jurisprudence of the fourth amendment does not
necessarily favor blanket exceptions to the warrant requirement,
especially where police must be familiar with alternative standards
anyway. Although protective sweeps might be legitimate in certain
circumstances, the courts should not create a flat waiver of the
warrant requirement too readily. As commentators have suggested,
bright-line rules are not always preferable to individual determina-
tions, as individual determinations may be better at finding the
right result."'
Fifth, this bright-line rule creates perverse incentives. For ex-
ample, the police will have strong reasons not to arrest a person on
her porch, for by waiting until the suspect enters the house to
make the arrest, police can obtain the authority to sweep. The rule
increases the chances that police will invade the privacy of the
home, unless officers believe that the risks of entry outweigh the
potential benefits of the sweep.
B. Traditional Fourth Amendment Analysis: Distinguishing Be-
tween Threats
It is worth reconsidering at this point the constitutional inter-
est at stake: the privacy of the home. The fourth amendment tra-
ditionally has afforded private dwellings the greatest protection,
since at common law the home was considered a person's castle.92
As the Court has noted, "It is familiar history that indiscriminate
searches and seizures conducted under the authority of 'general
warrants' were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and
Fourth Amendment does not come into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct if the
officers stop short of something called a 'technical arrest' or a 'full-blown search.'" Terry,
392 U.S. at 19.
" See Note, Police Practices and the Threatened Destruction of Tangible Evidence, 84
Harv.L.Rev. 1465, 1472-74 (1971); Albert W. Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth
Amendment, 45 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 227, 256 (1984).
" The common law drew a sharp distinction between a search of private premises and
other kinds of searches. See Daniel M. Harris, The Return to Common Sense: A Response to
"The Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment," 22 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 25, 27 (1984). See also
Payton, 445 U.S. at 601 (an "overriding respect for the sanctity of the home. . .has been
embedded in our traditions since the origins of the Republic"); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (comparing expectation of privacy in automobiles with that
in private residences).
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adoption of the Fourth Amendment." Thus one should not lightly
toss aside "the basic principle of Fourth Amendment law that
searches and seizures inside a man's house without a warrant are
per se unreasonable." 93
Determining whether a particular protective sweep is reasona-
ble represents a sound alternative to the blanket endorsement of
all protective sweeps incident to arrest. To produce consistent re-
sults, however, the guiding legal standards must be coherent and
easy to administer. It is possible to develop such legal standards
for the protective sweep.
Using traditional fourth amendment analysis, one can break
the category of protective sweeps into two subsets, the search to
protect against injury and the search to preserve evidence. In eval-
uating the reasonableness of a sweep under each set, the courts
should balance the severity of the invasion of privacy against the
immediate need to search. Because the urgency of the intrusion
depends on whether police are concerned about their safety or
merely about the destruction of evidence, courts should not treat
all sweeps alike. Two policies support this approach: first, society
values public safety more than the preservation of evidence, and
second, other alternatives are frequently available to protect
evidence.94
The following general principles provide a backdrop for devel-
oping workable standards for legal sweeps. First, the courts should
treat sweeps according to the principles of the exigent circum-
stances exception. Thus, even where officers have reason to believe
that evidence is in imminent danger of destruction or reason to
suspect that they are endangered, the court should not uphold the
sweep if the officers could have avoided it by responsible law en-
forcement. One of the fundamental principles of the exigent cir-
cumstance exception is that the events surrounding the arrest may
not be a product of manipulative or careless police work. As Jus-
tice Brennan explains, exigent circumstances will excuse the war-
rant requirement only where "the emergency giving rise to the
warrantless entry could not responsibly have been avoided."' 5
9' Payton, 445 U.S. at 583; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477-78 (1971).
For example, police may stake out premises to make sure that a third party does not
leave with the evidence. Such an option is not available when the concern is that the third
party is armed and dangerous.
95 Vasquez, 454 U.S. at 988 (Brennan dissenting from denial of certiorari). This notion
is tied to the principle that "a warrantless search must be 'strictly circumscribed by the
exigencies which justify its initiation." Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978), citing
Terry, 392 U.S. at 26. Thus, in Segura, 663 F.2d at 415, the court deemed a search unconsti-
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Where police have probable cause to search and time to obtain ei-
ther a telephonic or a standard warrant, but nonetheless neglect to
apply for one, courts should not let any subsequent "exigency" ex-
cuse the lack of a warrant.96
Second, the fourth amendment requires use of the least intru-
sive alternative. Courts thus must determine whether the police
could have avoided a sweep by securing or surveilling the premises
from the outside. Even when there is an exigency, police must re-
spond in the least intrusive manner. When police know that no one
is on the premises, for example, they should secure the property
from the outside.9 7 Even if there are people on the premises, if of-
ficers can remain safe or protect evidence by monitoring the prem-
ises rather than conducting an interior sweep, the police must
choose the former alternative until a warrant issues or circum-
stances change. 8 Courts must carefully consider available alterna-
tive means of protection, otherwise the protective sweep doctrine
will be vulnerable to police abuse.
Third, courts may properly weigh extenuating circumstances
surrounding the effort to obtain a warrant. For example, if a police
officer attempts to obtain a warrant but subsequently concludes
that she cannot wait until the warrant actually issues, the warrant-
less protective sweep may be reasonable. Occasionally, police of-
ficers wait to gather more evidence before approaching a magis-
trate for a warrant, or are forced to wait and watch until a warrant
tutional where law enforcement agents created the urgency of the situation. The officers had
knocked at the door of the suspected drug dealer's hotel room, knowing that the knock on
the door would cause the defendant to try to destroy evidence. The court would not use an
exigency of the officers' own making to uphold the sweep. See also Morgan, 743 F.2d at 1163
(planned arrest allowed for obtaining a warrant in advance).
On the other hand, where nature will destroy evidence, warrantless searches are consti-
tutional. By definition, police do not contrive these emergency situations. See cases cited in
note 8 above.
" Where police officers need to search immediately, they should seek a telephonic war-
rant. Courts should excuse warrantless searches on grounds of lack of time only with refer-
ence to the amount of time it takes to obtain a telephonic warrant. Moreover, as one court
has noted, "[the state] cannot justify a failure to use the telephonic warrant procedure on
the ground that it lacks equipment to record the oral statements of law enforcement of-
ficers." Wulferdinger, 782 F.2d at 1477.
The trouble with current practice involving telephonic warrants is that courts first scold
police officers for not obtaining one, but then uphold the warrantless search anyway. See, for
example, id. at 1477; Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 590; Jones, 696 F.2d at 487. The failure to effect
the mandate for telephonic warrants is another example of setting high standards and then
not enforcing them. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
See Veillette, 778 F.2d at 902 n.2.
18 See United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1986); Congote,
656 F.2d at 974. See also the discussion of Segura in note 97 above.
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arrives. If exigent circumstances arise in the meantime, the ur-
gency necessitating the sweep is not necessarily self-created.99
Assuming that the exigencies are not of the police's own mak-
ing and that there are no less intrusive alternatives, the following
sections set forth the appropriate standards for protective sweeps.
1. The Protective Sweep to Protect Officer Safety. Society val-
ues few, if any, interests more than protecting the public from in-
jury. As Terry held, where the intrusion on privacy is not great and
the potential danger is significant, it is reasonable to allow a search
based only upon an officer's articulable suspicion of danger. 00 This
rationale applies convincingly to those protective sweeps designed
to prevent injury to the public and police.101 Privacy interests are
simply less compelling when life is at risk, and so, in this context,
the courts should waive both the warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of the fourth amendment. Thus, to initiate a constitu-
tional protective sweep, an officer need only show reason to suspect
that there are armed and dangerous third persons on the premises.
99 For example, the court in Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir. 1980), ana-
lyzed the following circumstances in assessing the validity of the warrantless search:
"Whether the entry sought to be made [was] in an area where a magistrate [was] or [was]
not readily available, and whether another officer [was] available to keep watch on the
premises while an officer [sought] a search warrant. . . ." Similarly, the court in United
States v. Gray, 626 F.2d 102, 104-05 (9th Cir. 1980), upheld a warrantless sweep where a
district attorney declined to apply for the warrant without further evidence of probable
cause, and police had persisted in vain to get him to change his mind. On the evening that
urgent circumstances arose, both the district attorney and magistrate were unavailable. See
also United States v. Allison, 639 F.2d 792, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (police officers first tele-
phoned the U.S. Attorney, who counseled an immediate warrantless search).
100 One could argue, however, that by applying a lower standard of certainty to certain
protective sweeps, courts ironically expose police to unnecessary risk. In certain circum-
stances, it would be safer for police to leave the scene of the arrest, rather than search the
premises for people who might pose a danger to them. See Gary Kelder and Alan J.
Statman, The Protective Sweep Doctrine, 30 Syracuse L.Rev. 973, 1022 (1979).
This argument is not compelling. Police should be free to decide whether it is safer to
sweep the premises or to retire from the area. As long as the police have reason to suspect
that their safety is imperilled, they should be able to act in the most minimally intrusive
manner to protect themselves. Often this will entail a sweep of the premises. As Justice
Harlan pointed out in his concurrence to Terry: "There is no reason why an officer, right-
fully but forcibly confronting a person suspected of a serious crime, should have to ask one
question and take the risk that the answer might be a bullet." Terry, 392 U.S. at 33. Simi-
larly, an arresting officer should not have to risk the bullets of the arrestee's cohorts in
crime: a protective sweep, based on reasonable suspicions of danger, could address this risk.
101 Situations calling for sweeps are similar to the one that arose in Terry:
both deal. . .with an entire rubric of police conduct-necessarily swift action predi-
cated upon the on-the-spot observations of the officer on the beat-which historically
has not been, and as a practical matter could not be, subjected to the warrant
procedure.
Terry at 20.
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Nonetheless, law enforcement officers cannot manipulate soci-
ety's concern for their safety to their advantage. To prevent police
from infringing upon privacy interests, courts should ask arresting
officers to demonstrate exactly what Terry requires for a stop and
a frisk: a minimal, objective basis for their fear of harm.10 The
grounds for their anxiety must be more than a bare feeling; the
suspicion must be founded upon specific, articulable facts.103 In de-
termining the reasonableness of the suspicion, the court must con-
sider the totality of the circumstances from the police officer's per-
spective, taking into account his experience and training. These
requirements serve to prevent police from using suspicion of dan-
ger as a pretext for a warrantless sweep.
This is a workable doctrine. The Terry reasonable suspicion
model went into effect in the summer of 1968. For twenty years,
police have operated with the notion that they have a right to stop
and frisk a person on the street who appears to be armed and dan-
gerous, so long as the stop and the frisk are based upon articulable
observation and not mere hunches. Police can apply the expertise
they have acquired in the Terry context to protective sweeps.
In applying the Terry reasonable suspicion test to protective
sweeps, a number of factors would be critical in determining the
legitimacy of the officer's alleged suspicion. The officer should first
possess a reason to suspect there are third persons on the prop-
erty.' Although a relevant consideration, the suspicion of, belief
in, or actual knowledge of the presence of weapons on the premises
is not sufficient in itself to justify a protective sweep. 10 5 Similarly,
the heinousness of the underlying crime alone cannot support a
"02 See Kelder and Statman, 30 Syracuse L.Rev. at 1015 (cited in note 100): "[t]he
fourth amendment requires that a real need, not a hypothetical concern, be demonstrated,
based on specific information, before a search can be deemed reasonable." One court has
commented on the search for the appropriate standard as follows:
An overly restrictive view of the [protective sweep] doctrine might expose arresting
officers to unnecessary dangers without providing any greater protection to legitimate
Fourth Amendment interests. An overly deferential attitude toward officers' suspicions,
on the other hand, could seriously infringe upon the right to be free from unreasonable
searches.
Wiga, 662 F.2d at 1331. The Wiga court believed that the reasonable suspicion standard,
grounded upon specific articulable information, struck the appropriate balance of interests.
3 "An unjustified but sincere fear by an officer cannot excuse noncompliance or the
protection of the occupants' privacy interest would depend on no more than an officer's
anxiety." McConney, 728 F.2d at 1206.
10 See Hatcher; 680 F.2d at 444.
102 See Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d at 298: "[W]ithout reason to believe that a criminal
suspect was aware of police surveillance, the mere presence of firearms or destructible, in-
criminating evidence does not create exigent circumstances."
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protective sweep, but it is a valid factor in the overall analysis. 106
Likewise, if the arrestee has a reputation for operating with con-
spirators, that is a legitimate element in determining the reasona-
bleness of the search. The time and location of the search are rele-
vant too, since safe withdrawal with the arrestee may be more
difficult because of the hour of the arrest or the remoteness of the
locale. 10 7 On the other hand, if a police officer has reason to suspect
that there are armed parties on the premises, this alone is a suffi-
cient basis to support a protective sweep. 0
The reasonable suspicion test for sweeps, unlike the blanket
exception, avoids arbitrary distinctions. Rather than focusing on
places, such as inside a dwelling versus outside, the individual de-
termination looks directly to the risk itself. Thus, if an arrest is
sufficiently removed from the premises so that there is no reasona-
ble objective basis for suspecting danger from anyone inside, any
subsequent sweep would violate the fourth amendment. On the
other hand, where officers can demonstrate particular grounds for
suspecting that persons hidden on the premises jeopardize their
safety-even if an arrest has occurred outside-the protective
sweep is reasonable and constitutional.' 9 It may be that the Court
106 Trafficking in narcotics should not be deemed sufficiently dangerous to excuse fail-
ure to obtain a search warrant. See United States v. Spetz, 721 F.2d 1457, 1466-67 (9th Cir.
1983); Hatcher, 680 F.2d at 444 (drug dealing not sufficiently dangerous to allow sweep
without greater cause). But see United States v. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d 655, 665 (11th Cir.
1982) (upholding a warrantless search in part because "drug dealers are likely to be armed
and dangerous").
See also Baldacchino, 762 F.2d at 176 (gravity of the underlying offense is a factor in
assessing exigency of the situation).
'07 See United States v. Whitten, 706 F.2d 1000, 1014 (9th Cir. 1983).
108 See Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d at 297-98 ("were we to confine our attention to the
D.E.A. agents' predicament when Munoz-Guerra (a suspected armed drug-dealer) left them
standing at the patio door, purportedly to retrieve a key from an adjoining room, we would
dispense with the requirement of a warrant")(emphasis added); United States v. Gilbert,
774 F.2d 962, 964 (9th Cir. 1985) (sweep proper where officers "had information that appel-
lant might be in the company of another fugitive who was reported to be armed"); Elkins,
732 F.2d at 1285 (officers knew Elkins was armed and therefore dangerous); Whitten, 706
F.2d at 1014 (upholding sweep on grounds that there were several cars present in the drive-
way, and a few confederates were known to be armed and in the general area); Jones, 635
F.2d at 1361 (upholding sweep where reasonable to believe that Jones, having fired a gun on
main street, was armed and dangerous even though he had retired to his home).
"I Irizarry, 673 F.2d at 558, is a good illustration of this principle. Immediately after a
difficult arrest of three armed suspects in the hallway of a hotel, the police entered the
gang's hotel room to ensure that no one else was present. The court found a compelling need
to search for another dangerous person.
See also United States v. Burgos, 720 F.2d 1520, 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), finding that "the
inevitable delay incident to obtaining a warrant must give way to an urgent need for imme-
diate action." Where an illegal gun dealer whose home was a virtual arsenal jeopardized
public safety,
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should require a slightly greater showing of need or certainty of
danger before permitting entry of a building when an arrest occurs
outside, but under the least restrictive alternative rule, this balanc-
ing of interests is a familiar exercise."' Further, where the police
have a warrant to arrest, the warrant already authorizes them to
enter the home to effect the arrest.1 When dealing with officer
safety, the courts should consider whether the protective sweep
was reasonable based on the totality of circumstances-an inquiry
familiar to police officers.
2. The Protective Sweep to Preserve Evidence. The tradi-
tional fourth amendment rule-requiring probable cause plus exi-
gent circumstances before a court will waive the warrant require-
ment1l 2-should apply to evidentiary sweeps. Although there is
nothing unusual in this formulation, courts have had difficulty de-
fining what constitutes exigent circumstances justifying the waiver
of the warrant requirement for evidentiary sweeps. The task is
much easier, however, if one keeps in mind the proper order of
values suggested by the fourth amendment: first, privacy; then,
[q]uick action increased the likelihood that no one would be injured .... [Thus] [flaw
enforcement officers who have lawfully apprehended a suspect on a portion of a struc-
ture.... which they have reason to believe contains dangerous third persons who might
pose a threat to their safety have a right to conduct a reasonable security check of such
premises.
The court concluded that under these circumstances, a protective sweep was constitution-
ally permissible.
For examples of this same principle in the Fifth Circuit, see United States v. Jackson,
700 F.2d 181, 190 (5th Cir. 1983) (entry of a motel room is proper after two persons were
arrested outside the room, as it was not known how many individuals were involved in the
drug transaction, and it had been reported that the persons were armed); Sheikh, 654 F.2d
at 1071. For Ninth Circuit examples, see Whitten, 706 F.2d at 1014; United States v. As-
torga-Torres, 682 F.2d 1331, 1334 (9th Cir. 1982); Gardner, 627 F.2d at 910 n.2.
110 Justice Brennan, in his dissent from denial of certiorari in Vasquez, 454 U.S. at 987
and n.3, noted that several cases have allowed a security search where police possessed a
reasonable apprehension of violence from within the house as they executed an arrest
outside. He nonetheless objected to the sweep in Vasquez because it was "based on nothing
more than the officers' 'reasonable belief' that there were additional persons in the apart-
ment who were aware of petitioner's arrest." Id. at 987. Brennan advocated a greater show-
ing of danger for entry into a home where the arrest is made outside.
111 Wayne L. LaFave, 2 Searches and Seizures § 6.5(b) at 445 (1978), states,
[T]here seems to be no basis for limiting warrantless searches to save evidence to cases
where the police are already within, unless it is believed that the added element of
entry without prior approval of a magistrate is uniquely offensive, which hardly seems
logical.
The same rationale would apply in the context of protective sweeps to ensure officer safety.
112 Where warrants are issued upon probable cause, the presumption is that the search
is reasonable. Similarly, if an officer has probable cause to search, but exigent circumstances
prevent her from obtaining a warrant, the resulting warrantless search is nonetheless
deemed constitutional.
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safety; then, effective law enforcement.
Regardless of the urgency of the situation, the courts should
not authorize any sweep to prevent the destruction of evidence un-
less the police have probable cause to believe that evidence of a
crime is on the premises. If probable cause is established, the court
must determine whether there are exigent circumstances. There
are three possible formulations: probable cause to believe evidence
(1) is threatened with destruction; (2) is in danger of imminent de-
struction; or (3) is in the process of destruction. Gary Kelder and
Alan Statman have rejected the first formulation in favor of the
third:
A mere threat of removal or destruction [of evidence] should
not qualify as an exigent circumstance that can justify failure
to obtain the before-the-fact review of a judicial officer that is
"generally required to search a person's home." A more strin-
gent standard is called for,. . . a reasonable basis for the be-
lief that the evidence [is] in the "process of destruction" or
removal. 113
The problem with the third formulation, however, is that it would
unreasonably hamper the law enforcement process. If something is
undergoing destruction, chances are that officers are already too
late. It is perhaps for this reason that no circuit court has adopted
this standard.
On the other hand, Kelder and Statman are correct that a
court should not allow a warrantless search of a home every time
evidence merely is "threatened with destruction." This standard is
too nebulous. A police officer might rationally perceive a possibility
of the destruction of evidence whenever there is probable cause to
believe that evidence is on the premises. A threatened-destruction-
of-evidence standard thus might reduce in practice to a police of-
ficer's having probable cause to believe that evidence is on the
premises. This is tantamount to waiving the warrant requirement
altogether. 114 Probable cause to believe that evidence is in danger
of imminent destruction strikes a more proper balance, one that is
sufficiently stringent without emasculating the powers of the
police.
Again, this rule avoids the arbitrary results possible under a
blanket sweep exception. The rule does not automatically foreclose
1I Kelder and Statman, 30 Syracuse L.Rev. at 995 (cited in note 100) (footnotes omit-
ted), quoting Mincey, 437 U.S. at 394.
114 See Note, 84 Harv.L.Rev. at 1473 (cited in note 91).
[55:684
Clean Sweeps
recourse to protective sweeps when an arrest occurs outside the
premises. 1 5 With an exigent circumstances test, the situation
taken as a whole determines whether the invasion of the home was
justified.The following example illustrates the advantages of indi-
vidual adjudication over the bright-line rule in the context of pro-
tective sweeps to preserve evidence. The police have a warrant to
arrest a suspect for trafficking in cocaine, but are unable to obtain
a search warrant. The agents apprehend the suspect on her front
porch, and she calls out to someone in the building. Immediately
the police hear the sound of running water and a toilet flushing. In
this case, even though the arrest took place outside, a preventive
sweep of the premises is appropriate: the police have probable
cause to believe that evidence is in the process of destruction. The
risk is just as great whether they are standing inside or outside the
premises.
Several criteria will help the courts assess whether the police
have probable cause to believe evidence is in imminent danger of
destruction.11 First, the circumstances must be viewed from the
perspective of a trained officer. 117 Second, where the police have
probable cause to believe there is a third party on the premises
who knows of the impending or actual arrest, they will have suffi-
cient cause to believe that evidence is threatened with almost cer-
tain destruction. 18 In this now-or-never situation, protective
115 Even Justice Brennan concedes that "a warrantless entry is permissible in exigent
circumstances." He suggests that the only situation in which the destruction of evidence'
could create sufficient exigency allowing the police to enter and sweep a home is where
"there is probable cause to search" and a "'reasonable belief' based on articulable facts,
that destruction of evidence was imminent." Vasquez, 454 U.S. at 988 (Brennan dissenting
from denial of certiorari).
"' Certain facts-the flushing toilet, running water, burning papers-are almost per se
signs of the destruction of evidence. See, for example, United States v. Renfro, 620 F.2d 569,
572, 575 (6th Cir. 1980) (sweep permitted where arresting officers knocked on the door, then
observed the defendant moving "back and forth" in an upstairs room; sounds of a toilet
flushing emanated from the second floor window). Of course, officers need not await signs of
destruction in progress. See Hackett, 638 F.2d at 1182 (discovery of hidden transmitter in
crate of cocaine creates exigent circumstances).
7 Although the courts will assume this perspective, police nevertheless must have rea-
sonable grounds for their beliefs. See Vasquez, 638 F.2d at 532 (relying on lower court's
explicit findings that the officers had "reasonable bases for their belief that additional evi-
dence was present in the apartment and that there might be someone there who could de-
stroy it").
In Cuaron, 700 F.2d at 586 n.4, the court was self-conscious about its announced "rea-
son to believe" standard. Although the court would have upheld the sweep if the officers
only had reason to believe the evidence might be destroyed, the court emphasized--over the
dissent's protests to the contrary-that "by 'reason to believe' we mean just that: reason to
believe. Mere guesswork or a whim will not do."
Il Assuming that the person could destroy the evidence without leaving the premises.
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sweeps are valid." 9
Thus the legitimacy of the sweep often will turn on whether
the police have probable cause to believe that there is a third party
on the premises who knows of the government investigation.120
Several factors are relevant to this determination, as the following
examples illustrate:12'
Example 1. The police are conducting a large undercover narcotics
operation which entails a series of arrests. One of the arrests occurs
in public. It is possible that the head of the narcotics ring either
will be informed of the arrest, or will suspect that it has occurred.
It may be reasonable to infer that evidence soon will be in danger
of imminent destruction.
Example 2. Drug dealers frequently employ runners to deliver
drugs and to return with the money from the transaction. 2 Often
the supplier will also send out a person to observe whether the
transaction goes according to plan. If police have arrested the run-
ner and become aware of the probable existence of counter-surveil-
lance, they will have probable cause to believe that their under-
cover investigation has been detected. Evidence is in danger of
imminent destruction. 2 3
119 See Driver, 776 F.2d at 811 (dicta commenting that where there is a substantial
likelihood that someone has discovered or is likely to discover the arrest, this may in itself
create an exigent circumstance); Segura, 663 F.2d at 414-15 (declining to uphold the sweep,
as officers possessed no reason to believe that third persons were inside the premises or that
third persons who could destroy evidence were aware of the arrest outside); Vasquez, 638
•F.2d at 531 (officers had reason to believe that third persons inside the premises were aware
of the arrest outside; it was "reasonable to infer that evidence could well be destroyed").
120 Courts often rely on the five factors listed in United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262
(3d Cir. 1973) in assessing the propriety of a sweep. See, for example, Thompson, 700 F.2d
at 948; Turner, 650 F.2d at 528. The Rubin court looked to:
(1) The degree of urgency involved and amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant;
(2) reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be removed; (3) the possibility of
danger to police guarding the site of the contraband while a search warrant is sought;
(4) information indicating the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police
are on their trail; and (5) the ready destructibility of the contraband ...
Rubin, 474 F.2d at 268 (citations omitted). These factors have proven to be unworkable and
have contributed to the confusion among the circuits as to what is required before a search
is constitutional. The Rubin test fails to distinguish between searches to preserve evidence
and searches to protect people, suggesting that each factor is as important as the others.
121 In all of these examples, the officers must first establish that they have probable
cause to believe that there are, or will be, third persons on the premises.
122 Several courts have considered the arrest of a runner who is in the process of com-
pleting a sale to be sufficient grounds for believing that his boss would be notified of his own
impending arrest. See, for example, Moore, 790 F.2d at 16; United States v. Acevedo, 627
F.2d 68, 71 (7th Cir. 1980).
123 See Wulferdinger, 782 F.2d at 1476 (enumerating several factors which gave police
probable cause to believe that evidence was in danger of imminent destruction: (1) an ap-
prehended runner was expected to return with the cash from the drug transaction; (2) police
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Example 3. Police arrest a runner in public. The arrestee calls out
to a gathering crowd, "Tell my brother!" The police have probable
cause to believe the brother will be so informed and will destroy
evidence before a search warrant can be obtained.
Example 4. Police carefully plant a beeper in a package of narcot-
ics. They trail the package to its ultimate destination, and observe
its receipt. After a short span of time, however, the transmitter
falls silent. The police can reasonably infer that their equipment
has been discovered.124 If the police do not act, evidence is almost
certain to be destroyed.
The weaknesses of this formulation arise out of the reluctance
of judges to enforce the exclusionary rule ex post and the ability of
police to fabricate grounds for believing that evidence was in dan-
ger of imminent destruction. These risks, however, are not unique
to the protective sweep. They are inherent in any use of the exclu-
sionary rule. The protective sweep model proposed here will strike
the proper balance between privacy interests and the law enforce-
ment process if judges are sensitive to the vulnerabilities of the
exclusionary rule.
CONCLUSION
The protective sweep should not be added to the expanding
list of exceptions to the warrant requirement. Courts should not
regard the goal of efficient law enforcement as paramount by com-
parison to the threat of arbitrary warrantless searches. While ad
hoc determinations of constitutionality are more difficult to admin-
ister in theory, a blanket protective sweep exception in practice
would not result in significant savings for either the courts or po-
lice officers. Moreover, individual consideration of the reasonable-
ness of sweeps will approach the correct result more readily than a
flat exception.
Courts should uphold protective sweeps only where officers
have reason to suspect their safety is endangered, or probable
cause to believe that evidence is in imminent danger of destruc-
tion. Police are already familiar with both the reasonable suspicion
were aware of possible counter-surveillance; (3) the public arrest of the runner might have
enabled an onlooker to notify the others; and (4) when the police knocked on the door of the
suspect's premises, he ran to the back of the house shouting, "The cops are here!"); Hicks,
752 F.2d at 382 (probable cause to believe that there were persons in the defendant's resi-
dence who would destroy evidence was established on the basis of defendant's use of
counter-surveillance).
124 See Hackett, 638 F.2d at 1182.
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standard announced by Terry, and the probable cause plus exigent
circumstances criteria used widely in police work. With time and
consistent application, the two-tiered protective sweep doctrine
proposed here can produce a body of law to guide police officers
confronted with the risk of third persons on the premises.1 25
"' The negligence standard provides one example of this. Once it was new, but by now
the courts and the public have come to understand what "due care" means. It is wrong to
suggest that such a process will take place only when one establishes a bright-line rule. See
Alschuler, 45 U.Pitt.L.Rev. at 256 (cited in note 91).
